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             Pre-Congestion Notification (PCN) Architecture 
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Abstract 
 
   This document describes a general architecture for flow admission and 
   termination based on pre-congestion information in order to protect 
   the quality of service of established, inelastic flows within a 
   single Diffserv domain. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
1.1.  Overview of PCN 
 
   The objective of Pre-Congestion Notification (PCN) is to protect the 
   quality of service (QoS) of inelastic flows within a Diffserv domain 
   in a simple, scalable, and robust fashion.  Two mechanisms are used: 
   admission control, to decide whether to admit or block a new flow 
   request, and (in abnormal circumstances) flow termination, to decide 
   whether to terminate some of the existing flows.  To achieve this, 
   the overall rate of PCN-traffic is metered on every link in the 
   domain, and PCN packets are appropriately marked when certain 
   configured rates are exceeded.  These configured rates are below the 
   rate of the link, thus providing notification to boundary nodes about 
   overloads before any congestion occurs (hence, "Pre-Congestion 
   Notification").  The level of marking allows boundary nodes to make 
   decisions about whether to admit or terminate. 
 
   Within a PCN-domain, PCN-traffic is forwarded in a prioritised 
   Diffserv traffic class.  Every link in the PCN-domain is configured 
   with two rates (PCN-threshold-rate and PCN-excess-rate).  If the 
   overall rate of PCN-traffic on a link exceeds a configured rate, then 
   a PCN-interior-node marks PCN-packets appropriately.  The PCN-egress- 
   nodes use this information to make admission control and flow 
   termination decisions.  Flow admission control determines whether a 
   new flow can be admitted without any impact, in normal circumstances, 
   on the QoS of existing PCN-flows.  However, in abnormal circumstances 
   (for instance, a disaster affecting multiple nodes and causing 
   traffic re-routes), the QoS on existing PCN-flows may degrade even 
   though care was exercised when admitting those flows.  The flow 
   termination mechanism removes sufficient traffic in order to protect 
   the QoS of the remaining PCN-flows.  All PCN-boundary-nodes and PCN- 
   interior-nodes are PCN-enabled and are trusted for correct PCN 
   operation.  PCN-ingress-nodes police arriving packets to check that 
   they are part of an admitted PCN-flow that keeps within its agreed 
   flowspec, and hence they maintain per-flow state.  PCN-interior-nodes 
   meter all PCN-traffic, and hence do not need to maintain any per-flow 
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   state.  Decisions about flow admission and termination are made for a 
   particular pair of PCN-boundary-nodes, and hence PCN-egress-nodes 
   must be able to identify which PCN-ingress-node sent each PCN-packet. 
 
1.2.  Example Use Case for PCN 
 
   This section outlines an end-to-end QoS scenario that uses the PCN 
   mechanisms within one domain.  The parts outside the PCN-domain are 
   out of scope for PCN, but are included to help clarify how PCN could 
   be used.  Note that this section is only an example -- in particular, 
   there are other possibilities (see Section 3) for how the PCN- 
   boundary-nodes perform admission control and flow termination. 
 
   As a fundamental building block, each link of the PCN-domain operates 
   the following.  Please refer to [Eardley09] and Figure 1. 
 
   o  A threshold meter and marker, which marks all PCN-packets if the 
      rate of PCN-traffic is greater than a first configured rate, the 
      PCN-threshold-rate.  The admission control mechanism limits the 
      PCN-traffic on each link to *roughly* its PCN-threshold-rate. 
 
   o  An excess-traffic meter and marker, which marks a proportion of 
      PCN-packets such that the amount marked equals the traffic rate in 
      excess of a second configured rate, the PCN-excess-rate.  The flow 
      termination mechanism limits the PCN-traffic on each link to 
      *roughly* its PCN-excess-rate. 
 
   Overall, the aim is to give an "early warning" of potential 
   congestion before there is any significant build-up of PCN-packets in 
   the queue on the link; we term this "Pre-Congestion Notification" by 
   analogy with ECN (Explicit Congestion Notification, [RFC3168]).  Note 
   that the link only meters the bulk PCN-traffic (and not per flow). 
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                          ==   Metering &    == 
                          ==Marking behaviour==       ==PCN mechanisms== 
                       ^ 
           Rate of     ^ 
      PCN-traffic on   | 
     bottleneck link   | 
                       | 
                       |       Some pkts                  Terminate some 
                       |  excess-traffic-marked           admitted flows 
                       |           &                            & 
                       |     Rest of pkts                Block new flows 
                       |   threshold-marked 
                       | 
     PCN-excess-rate  -|------------------------------------------------ 
(=PCN-supportable-rate)| 
                       |       All pkts                  Block new flows 
                       |   threshold-marked 
                       | 
   PCN-threshold-rate -|------------------------------------------------ 
 (=PCN-admissible-rate)| 
                       |        No pkts                  Admit new flows 
                       |      PCN-marked 
                       | 
 
   Figure 1: Example of how the PCN admission control and flow 
   termination mechanisms operate as the rate of PCN-traffic increases. 
 
   The two forms of PCN-marking are indicated by setting the ECN and 
   DSCP (Differentiated Services Codepoint [RFC2474]) fields to known 
   values, which are configured for the domain.  Thus, the PCN-egress- 
   nodes can monitor the PCN-markings in order to measure the severity 
   of pre-congestion.  In addition, the PCN-ingress-nodes need to set 
   the ECN and DSCP fields to that configured for an unmarked PCN- 
   packet, and the PCN-egress-nodes need to revert to values appropriate 
   outside the PCN-domain. 
 
   For admission control, we assume end-to-end RSVP (Resource 
   Reservation Protocol) [RFC2205]) signalling in this example.  The 
   PCN-domain is a single RSVP hop.  The PCN-domain operates Diffserv, 
   and we assume that PCN-traffic is scheduled with the expedited 
   forwarding (EF) per-hop behaviour [RFC3246].  Hence, the overall 
   solution is in line with the "IntServ over Diffserv" framework 
   defined in [RFC2998], as shown in Figure 2. 
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   ___    ___    _______________________________________    ____    ___ 
  |   |  |   |  | PCN-             PCN-            PCN- |  |    |  |   | 
  |   |  |   |  |ingress         interior         egress|  |    |  |   | 
  |   |  |   |  | -node           -nodes          -node |  |    |  |   | 
  |   |  |   |  |-------+  +-------+  +-------+  +------|  |    |  |   | 
  |   |  |   |  |       |  | PCN   |  | PCN   |  |      |  |    |  |   | 
  |   |..|   |..|Ingress|..|meter &|..|meter &|..|Egress|..|    |..|   | 
  |   |..|   |..|Policer|..|marker |..|marker |..|Meter |..|    |..|   | 
  |   |  |   |  |-------+  +-------+  +-------+  +------|  |    |  |   | 
  |   |  |   |  |  \                                 /  |  |    |  |   | 
  |   |  |   |  |   \                               /   |  |    |  |   | 
  |   |  |   |  |    \  PCN-feedback-information   /    |  |    |  |   | 
  |   |  |   |  |     \  (for admission control)  /     |  |    |  |   | 
  |   |  |   |  |      --<-----<----<----<-----<--      |  |    |  |   | 
  |   |  |   |  |       PCN-feedback-information        |  |    |  |   | 
  |   |  |   |  |        (for flow termination)         |  |    |  |   | 
  |___|  |___|  |_______________________________________|  |____|  |___| 
 
  Sx     Access               PCN-domain                   Access    Rx 
  End    Network                                          Network   End 
  Host                                                              Host 
                  <---- signalling across PCN-domain---> 
                (for admission control & flow termination) 
 
  <-------------------end-to-end QoS signalling protocol---------------> 
 
   Figure 2: Example of possible overall QoS architecture. 
 
   A source wanting to start a new QoS flow sends an RSVP PATH message. 
   Normal hop-by-hop IntServ [RFC1633] is used outside the PCN-domain 
   (we assume successfully).  The PATH message travels across the PCN- 
   domain; the PCN-egress-node reads the PHOP (previous RSVP hop) object 
   to discover the specific PCN-ingress-node for this flow.  The RESV 
   message travels back from the receiver, and triggers the PCN-egress- 
   node to check what fraction of the PCN-traffic from the relevant PCN- 
   ingress-node is currently being threshold-marked.  It adds an object 
   with this information onto the RESV message, and hence the PCN- 
   ingress-node learns about the level of pre-congestion on the path. 
   If this level is below some threshold, then the PCN-ingress-node 
   admits the new flow into the PCN-domain.  The RSVP message triggers 
   the PCN-ingress-node to install two normal IntServ items: five-tuple 
   information, so that it can subsequently identify data packets that 
   are part of a previously admitted PCN-flow, and a traffic profile, so 
   that it can police the flow to within its reservation.  Similarly, 
   the RSVP message triggers the PCN-egress-node to install five-tuple 
   and PHOP information so that it can identify packets as part of a 
   flow from a specific PCN-ingress-node. 
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   The flow termination mechanism may happen when some abnormal 
   circumstance causes a link to become so pre-congested that it excess- 
   traffic-marks (and perhaps also drops) PCN-packets.  In this example, 
   when a PCN-egress-node observes such a packet, it then, with some 
   probability, terminates this PCN-flow; the probability is configured 
   low enough to avoid over termination and high enough to ensure rapid 
   termination of enough flows.  It also informs the relevant PCN- 
   ingress-node so that it can block any further traffic on the 
   terminated flow. 
 
1.3.  Applicability of PCN 
 
   Compared with alternative QoS mechanisms, PCN has certain advantages 
   and disadvantages that will make it appropriate in particular 
   scenarios.  For example, compared with hop-by-hop IntServ [RFC1633], 
   PCN only requires per-flow state at the PCN-ingress-nodes.  Compared 
   with the Diffserv architecture [RFC2475], an operator needs to be 
   less accurate and/or conservative in its prediction of the traffic 
   matrix.  The Diffserv architecture's traffic-conditioning agreements 
   are static and coarse; they are defined at subscription time and are 
   used (for instance) to limit the total traffic at each ingress of the 
   domain, regardless of the egress for the traffic.  On the other hand, 
   PCN firstly uses admission control based on measurements of the 
   current conditions between the specific pair of PCN-boundary-nodes, 
   and secondly, in case of a disaster, PCN protects the QoS of most 
   flows by terminating a few selected ones. 
 
   PCN's admission control is a measurement-based mechanism.  Hence, it 
   assumes that the present is a reasonable prediction of the future: 
   the network conditions are measured at the time of a new flow 
   request, but the actual network performance must be acceptable during 
   the call some time later.  Hence, PCN is unsuitable in several 
   circumstances: 
 
   o  If the source adapts its bit rate dependent on the level of pre- 
      congestion, because then the aggregate traffic might become 
      unstable.  The assumption in this document is that PCN-packets 
      come from real-time applications generating inelastic traffic, 
      such as the Controlled Load Service [RFC2211]. 
 
   o  If a potential bottleneck link has capacity for only a few flows, 
      because then a new flow can move a link directly from no pre- 
      congestion to being so overloaded that it has to drop packets. 
      The assumption in this document is that this isn't a problem. 
 
   o  If there is the danger of a "flash crowd", in which many admission 
      requests arrive within the reaction time of PCN's admission 
      mechanism, because then they all might get admitted and so 
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      overload the network.  The assumption in this document is that, if 
      it is necessary, then flash crowds are limited in some fashion 
      beyond the scope of this document, for instance by rate-limiting 
      QoS requests. 
 
   The applicability of PCN is discussed further in Section 6. 
 
1.4.  Documents about PCN 
 
   The purpose of this document is to describe a general architecture 
   for flow admission and termination based on (pre-)congestion 
   information in order to protect the quality of service of flows 
   within a Diffserv domain.  This document describes the PCN 
   architecture at a high level (Section 3) and in more detail 
   (Section 4).  It also defines some terminology, and provides 
   considerations about operations, management, and security.  Section 6 
   considers the applicability of PCN in more detail, covering its 
   benefits, deployment scenarios, assumptions, and potential 
   challenges.  The Appendix covers some potential future work items. 
 
   Aspects of PCN are also documented elsewhere: 
 
   o  Metering and marking: [Eardley09] standardises threshold metering 
      and marking and excess-traffic metering and marking.  A PCN-packet 
      may be marked, depending on the metering results. 
 
   o  Encoding: the "baseline" encoding is described in [Moncaster09-1], 
      which standardises two PCN encoding states (PCN-marked and not 
      PCN-marked), whilst (experimental) extensions to the baseline 
      encoding can provide three encoding states (threshold-marked, 
      excess-traffic-marked, or not PCN-marked), for instance, see 
      [Moncaster09-2].  (There may be further encoding states as 
      suggested in [Westberg08].)  Section 3.6 considers the backwards 
      compatibility of PCN encoding with ECN. 
 
   o  PCN-boundary-node behaviour: how the PCN-boundary-nodes convert 
      the PCN-markings into decisions about flow admission and flow 
      termination, as described in Informational documents such as 
      [Taylor09] and [Charny07-2].  The concept is that the standardised 
      metering and marking by PCN-nodes allows several possible PCN- 
      boundary-node behaviours.  A number of possibilities are outlined 
      in this document; detailed descriptions and comparisons are in 
      [Charny07-1] and [Menth09-2]. 
 
   o  Signalling between PCN-boundary-nodes: signalling is needed to 
      transport PCN-feedback-information between the PCN-boundary-nodes 
      (in the example above, this is the fraction of traffic, between 
      the pair of PCN-boundary-nodes, that is PCN-marked).  The exact 
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      details vary for different PCN-boundary-node behaviours, and so 
      should be described in those documents.  It may require an 
      extension to the signalling protocol -- standardisation is out of 
      scope of the PCN WG. 
 
   o  The interface by which the PCN-boundary-nodes learn identification 
      information about the admitted flows: the exact requirements vary 
      for different PCN-boundary-node behaviours and for different 
      signalling protocols, and so should be described in those 
      documents.  They will be similar to those described in the example 
      above -- a PCN-ingress-node needs to be able to identify that a 
      packet is part of a previously admitted flow (typically from its 
      five-tuple) and each PCN-boundary-node needs to be able to 
      identify the other PCN-boundary-node for the flow. 
 
2.  Terminology 
 
   o  PCN-domain: a PCN-capable domain; a contiguous set of PCN-enabled 
      nodes that perform Diffserv scheduling [RFC2474]; the complete set 
      of PCN-nodes that in principle can, through PCN-marking packets, 
      influence decisions about flow admission and termination for the 
      PCN-domain; includes the PCN-egress-nodes, which measure these 
      PCN-marks, and the PCN-ingress-nodes. 
 
   o  PCN-boundary-node: a PCN-node that connects one PCN-domain to a 
      node either in another PCN-domain or in a non-PCN-domain. 
 
   o  PCN-interior-node: a node in a PCN-domain that is not a PCN- 
      boundary-node. 
 
   o  PCN-node: a PCN-boundary-node or a PCN-interior-node. 
 
   o  PCN-egress-node: a PCN-boundary-node in its role in handling 
      traffic as it leaves a PCN-domain. 
 
   o  PCN-ingress-node: a PCN-boundary-node in its role in handling 
      traffic as it enters a PCN-domain. 
 
   o  PCN-traffic, PCN-packets, PCN-BA: a PCN-domain carries traffic of 
      different Diffserv behaviour aggregates (BAs) [RFC2474].  The 
      PCN-BA uses the PCN mechanisms to carry PCN-traffic, and the 
      corresponding packets are PCN-packets.  The same network will 
      carry traffic of other Diffserv BAs.  The PCN-BA is distinguished 
      by a combination of the Diffserv codepoint (DSCP) and ECN fields. 
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   o  PCN-flow: the unit of PCN-traffic that the PCN-boundary-node 
      admits (or terminates); the unit could be a single microflow (as 
      defined in [RFC2474]) or some identifiable collection of 
      microflows. 
 
   o  Pre-congestion: a condition of a link within a PCN-domain such 
      that the PCN-node performs PCN-marking, in order to provide an 
      "early warning" of potential congestion before there is any 
      significant build-up of PCN-packets in the real queue.  (Hence, by 
      analogy with ECN, we call our mechanism Pre-Congestion 
      Notification.) 
 
   o  PCN-marking: the process of setting the header in a PCN-packet 
      based on defined rules, in reaction to pre-congestion; either 
      threshold-marking or excess-traffic-marking.  Such a packet is 
      then called PCN-marked. 
 
   o  Threshold-metering: a metering behaviour that, if the PCN-traffic 
      exceeds the PCN-threshold-rate, indicates that all PCN-traffic is 
      to be threshold-marked. 
 
   o  PCN-threshold-rate: the reference rate of a threshold-meter, which 
      is configured for each link in the PCN-domain and which is lower 
      than the PCN-excess-rate. 
 
   o  Threshold-marking: the setting of the header in a PCN-packet to a 
      specific encoding, based on indications from the threshold-meter. 
      Such a packet is then called threshold-marked. 
 
   o  Excess-traffic-metering: a metering behaviour that, if the PCN- 
      traffic exceeds the PCN-excess-rate, indicates that the amount of 
      PCN-traffic to be excess-traffic-marked is equal to the amount in 
      excess of the PCN-excess-rate. 
 
   o  PCN-excess-rate: the reference rate of an excess-traffic-meter, 
      which is a configured for each link in the PCN-domain and which is 
      higher than the PCN-threshold-rate. 
 
   o  Excess-traffic-marking: the setting of the header in a PCN-packet 
      to a specific encoding, based on indications from the excess- 
      traffic-meter.  Such a packet is then called excess-traffic- 
      marked. 
 
   o  PCN-colouring: the process of setting the header in a PCN-packet 
      by a PCN-boundary-node; performed by a PCN-ingress-node so that 
      PCN-nodes can easily identify PCN-packets; performed by a PCN- 
      egress-node so that the header is appropriate for nodes beyond the 
      PCN-domain. 
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   o  Ingress-egress-aggregate: The collection of PCN-packets from all 
      PCN-flows that travel in one direction between a specific pair of 
      PCN-boundary-nodes. 
 
   o  PCN-feedback-information: information signalled by a PCN-egress- 
      node to a PCN-ingress-node (or a central control node), which is 
      needed for the flow admission and flow termination mechanisms. 
 
   o  PCN-admissible-rate: the rate of PCN-traffic on a link up to which 
      PCN admission control should accept new PCN-flows. 
 
   o  PCN-supportable-rate: the rate of PCN-traffic on a link down to 
      which PCN flow termination should, if necessary, terminate already 
      admitted PCN-flows. 
 
3.  High-Level Functional Architecture 
 
   The high-level approach is to split functionality between: 
 
   o  PCN-interior-nodes "inside" the PCN-domain, which monitor their 
      own state of pre-congestion and mark PCN-packets as appropriate. 
      They are not flow-aware, nor are they aware of ingress-egress- 
      aggregates.  The functionality is also done by PCN-ingress-nodes 
      for their outgoing interfaces (ie, those "inside" the PCN-domain). 
 
   o  PCN-boundary-nodes at the edge of the PCN-domain, which control 
      admission of new PCN-flows and termination of existing PCN-flows, 
      based on information from PCN-interior-nodes.  This information is 
      in the form of the PCN-marked data packets (which are intercepted 
      by the PCN-egress-nodes) and is not in signalling messages. 
      Generally, PCN-ingress-nodes are flow-aware. 
 
   The aim of this split is to keep the bulk of the network simple, 
   scalable, and robust, whilst confining policy, application-level, and 
   security interactions to the edge of the PCN-domain.  For example, 
   the lack of flow awareness means that the PCN-interior-nodes don't 
   care about the flow information associated with PCN-packets, nor do 
   the PCN-boundary-nodes care about which PCN-interior-nodes its 
   ingress-egress-aggregates traverse. 
 
   In order to generate information about the current state of the PCN- 
   domain, each PCN-node PCN-marks packets if it is "pre-congested". 
   Exactly when a PCN-node decides if it is "pre-congested" (the 
   algorithm) and exactly how packets are "PCN-marked" (the encoding) 
   will be defined in separate Standards Track documents, but at a high 
   level it is as follows: 
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   o  the algorithms: a PCN-node meters the amount of PCN-traffic on 
      each one of its outgoing (or incoming) links.  The measurement is 
      made as an aggregate of all PCN-packets, not per flow.  There are 
      two algorithms: one for threshold-metering and one for excess- 
      traffic-metering.  The meters trigger PCN-marking as necessary. 
 
   o  the encoding(s): a PCN-node PCN-marks a PCN-packet by modifying a 
      combination of the DSCP and ECN fields.  In the "baseline" 
      encoding [Moncaster09-1], the ECN field is set to 11 and the DSCP 
      is not altered.  Extension encodings may be defined that, at most, 
      use a second DSCP (eg, as in [Moncaster09-2]) and/or set the ECN 
      field to values other than 11 (eg, as in [Menth08-2]). 
 
   In a PCN-domain, the operator may have two or three encoding states 
   available.  The baseline encoding provides two encoding states (not 
   PCN-marked and PCN-marked), whilst extended encodings can provide 
   three encoding states (not PCN-marked, threshold-marked, and excess- 
   traffic-marked). 
 
   An operator may choose to deploy either admission control or flow 
   termination or both.  Although designed to work together, they are 
   independent mechanisms, and the use of one does not require or 
   prevent the use of the other.  Three encoding states naturally allows 
   both flow admission and flow termination.  If there are only two 
   encoding states, then there are several options -- see Section 3.3. 
 
   The PCN-boundary-nodes monitor the PCN-marked packets in order to 
   extract information about the current state of the PCN-domain.  Based 
   on this monitoring, a distributed decision is made about whether to 
   admit a prospective new flow or terminate existing flow(s).  Sections 
   4.4 and 4.5 mention various possibilities for how the functionality 
   could be distributed. 
 
   PCN-metering and PCN-marking need to be configured on all 
   (potentially pre-congested) links in the PCN-domain to ensure that 
   the PCN mechanisms protect all links.  The actual functionality can 
   be configured on the outgoing or incoming interfaces of PCN-nodes -- 
   or one algorithm could be configured on the outgoing interface and 
   the other on the incoming interface.  The important point is that a 
   consistent choice is made across the PCN-domain to ensure that the 
   PCN mechanisms protect all links.  See [Eardley09] for further 
   discussion. 
 
   The objective of threshold-marking, as triggered by the threshold- 
   metering algorithm, is to threshold-mark all PCN-packets whenever the 
   bit rate of PCN-packets is greater than some configured rate, the 
   PCN-threshold-rate.  The objective of excess-traffic-metering, as 
   triggered by the excess-traffic-marking algorithm, is to excess- 
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   traffic-mark PCN-packets at a rate equal to the difference between 
   the bit rate of PCN-packets and some configured rate, the PCN-excess- 
   rate.  Note that this description reflects the overall intent of the 
   algorithms rather than their instantaneous behaviour, since the rate 
   measured at a particular moment depends on the detailed algorithm, 
   its implementation, and the traffic's variance as well as its rate 
   (eg, marking may well continue after a recent overload, even after 
   the instantaneous rate has dropped).  The algorithms are specified in 
   [Eardley09]. 
 
   Admission and termination approaches are detailed and compared in 
   [Charny07-1] and [Menth09-2].  The discussion below is just a brief 
   summary.  Sections 3.1 and 3.2 assume there are three encoding states 
   available, whilst Section 3.3 assumes there are two encoding states 
   available. 
 
   From the perspective of the outside world, a PCN-domain essentially 
   looks like a Diffserv domain, but without the Diffserv architecture's 
   traffic-conditioning agreements.  PCN-traffic is either transported 
   across it transparently or policed at the PCN-ingress-node (ie, 
   dropped or carried at a lower QoS).  One difference is that PCN- 
   traffic has better QoS guarantees than normal Diffserv traffic 
   because the PCN mechanisms better protect the QoS of admitted flows. 
   Another difference may occur in the rare circumstance when there is a 
   failure: on the one hand, some PCN-flows may get terminated but, on 
   the other hand, other flows will get their QoS restored.  Non-PCN- 
   traffic is treated transparently, ie, the PCN-domain is a normal 
   Diffserv domain. 
 
3.1.  Flow Admission 
 
   The objective of PCN's flow admission control mechanism is to limit 
   the PCN-traffic on each link in the PCN-domain to *roughly* its PCN- 
   admissible-rate by admitting or blocking prospective new flows, in 
   order to protect the QoS of existing PCN-flows.  With three encoding 
   states available, the PCN-threshold-rate is configured by the 
   operator as equal to the PCN-admissible-rate on each link.  It is set 
   lower than the traffic rate at which the link becomes congested and 
   the node drops packets. 
 
   Exactly how the admission control decision is made will be defined 
   separately in Informational documents.  This document describes two 
   approaches (others might be possible): 
 
   o  The PCN-egress-node measures (possibly as a moving average) the 
      fraction of the PCN-traffic that is threshold-marked.  The 
      fraction is measured for a specific ingress-egress-aggregate.  If 
      the fraction is below a threshold value, then the new flow is 
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      admitted; if the fraction is above the threshold value, then it is 
      blocked.  The fraction could be measured as an EWMA (exponentially 
      weighted moving average), which has sometimes been called the 
      "congestion level estimate". 
 
   o  The PCN-egress-node monitors PCN-traffic and if it receives one 
      (or several) threshold-marked packets, then the new flow is 
      blocked; otherwise, it is admitted.  One possibility may be to 
      react to the marking state of an initial flow-setup packet (eg, 
      RSVP PATH).  Another is that after one (or several) threshold- 
      marks, all flows are blocked until after a specific period of no 
      congestion. 
 
   Note that the admission control decision is made for a particular 
   pair of PCN-boundary-nodes.  So it is quite possible for a new flow 
   to be admitted between one pair of PCN-boundary-nodes, whilst at the 
   same time another admission request is blocked between a different 
   pair of PCN-boundary-nodes. 
 
3.2.  Flow Termination 
 
   The objective of PCN's flow termination mechanism is to limit the 
   PCN-traffic on each link to *roughly* its PCN-supportable-rate, by 
   terminating some existing PCN-flows, in order to protect the QoS of 
   the remaining PCN-flows.  With three encoding states available, the 
   PCN-excess-rate is configured by the operator as equal to the PCN- 
   supportable-rate on each link.  It may be set lower than the traffic 
   rate at which the link becomes congested and at which the node drops 
   packets. 
 
   Exactly how the flow termination decision is made will be defined 
   separately in Informational documents.  This document describes 
   several approaches (others might be possible): 
 
   o  In one approach, the PCN-egress-node measures the rate of PCN- 
      traffic that is not excess-traffic-marked, which is the amount of 
      PCN-traffic that can actually be supported, and communicates this 
      to the PCN-ingress-node.  Also, the PCN-ingress-node measures the 
      rate of PCN-traffic that is destined for this specific PCN-egress- 
      node.  The difference represents the excess amount that should be 
      terminated. 
 
   o  Another approach instead measures the rate of excess-traffic- 
      marked traffic and terminates this amount of traffic.  This 
      terminates less traffic than the previous approach, if some nodes 
      are dropping PCN-traffic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Eardley                      Informational                     [Page 14] 
 
RFC 5559                    PCN Architecture                   June 2009 
 
 
   o  Another approach monitors PCN-packets and terminates some of the 
      PCN-flows that have an excess-traffic-marked packet.  (If all such 
      flows were terminated, far too much traffic would be terminated, 
      so a random selection needs to be made from those with an excess- 
      traffic-marked packet [Menth08-1].) 
 
   Since flow termination is designed for "abnormal" circumstances, it 
   is quite likely that some PCN-nodes are congested and, hence, that 
   packets are being dropped and/or significantly queued.  The flow 
   termination mechanism must accommodate this. 
 
   Note also that the termination control decision is made for a 
   particular pair of PCN-boundary-nodes.  So it is quite possible for 
   PCN-flows to be terminated between one pair of PCN-boundary-nodes, 
   whilst at the same time none are terminated between a different pair 
   of PCN-boundary-nodes. 
 
3.3.  Flow Admission and/or Flow Termination When There Are Only Two PCN 
      Encoding States 
 
   If a PCN-domain has only two encoding states available (PCN-marked 
   and not PCN-marked), ie, it is using the baseline encoding 
   [Moncaster09-1], then an operator has three options (others might be 
   possible): 
 
   o  admission control only: PCN-marking means threshold-marking, ie, 
      only the threshold-metering algorithm triggers PCN-marking.  Only 
      PCN admission control is available. 
 
   o  flow termination only: PCN-marking means excess-traffic-marking, 
      ie, only the excess-traffic-metering algorithm triggers PCN- 
      marking.  Only PCN termination control is available. 
 
   o  both admission control and flow termination: only the excess- 
      traffic-metering algorithm triggers PCN-marking; however, the 
      configured rate (PCN-excess-rate) is set equal to the PCN- 
      admissible-rate, as shown in Figure 3.  [Charny07-2] describes how 
      both admission control and flow termination can be triggered in 
      this case and also gives some pros and cons of this approach.  The 
      main downside is that admission control is less accurate. 
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                          ==   Metering &    == 
                          ==Marking behaviour==       ==PCN mechanisms== 
                       ^ 
           Rate of     ^ 
      PCN-traffic on   | 
     bottleneck link   |                                  Terminate some 
                       |                                  admitted flows 
                       |                                         & 
                       |                                 Block new flows 
                       | 
                       |       Some pkts 
   U*PCN-excess-rate  -|  excess-traffic-marked        ----------------- 
(=PCN-supportable-rate)| 
                       |                                 Block new flows 
                       | 
                       | 
     PCN-excess-rate  -|------------------------------------------------ 
 (=PCN-admissible-rate)| 
                       |         No pkts                 Admit new flows 
                       |       PCN-marked 
                       | 
 
   Figure 3: Schematic of how the PCN admission control and flow 
   termination mechanisms operate as the rate of PCN-traffic increases, 
   for a PCN-domain with two encoding states and using the approach of 
   [Charny07-2].  Note: U is a global parameter for all links in the 
   PCN-domain. 
 
3.4.  Information Transport 
 
   The transport of pre-congestion information from a PCN-node to a PCN- 
   egress-node is through PCN-markings in data packet headers, ie, "in- 
   band"; no signalling protocol messaging is needed.  Signalling is 
   needed to transport PCN-feedback-information -- for example, to 
   convey the fraction of PCN-marked traffic from a PCN-egress-node to 
   the relevant PCN-ingress-node.  Exactly what information needs to be 
   transported will be described in future documents about possible 
   boundary mechanisms.  The signalling could be done by an extension of 
   RSVP or NSIS (Next Steps in Signalling), for instance; [Lefaucheur06] 
   describes the extensions needed for RSVP. 
 
3.5.  PCN-Traffic 
 
   The following are some high-level points about how PCN works: 
 
   o  There needs to be a way for a PCN-node to distinguish PCN-traffic 
      from other traffic.  This is through a combination of the DSCP 
      field and/or ECN field. 
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   o  It is not advised to have competing-non-PCN-traffic but, if there 
      is such traffic, there needs to be a mechanism to limit it. 
      "Competing-non-PCN-traffic" means traffic that shares a link with 
      PCN-traffic and competes for its forwarding bandwidth.  Hence, 
      more competing-non-PCN-traffic results in poorer QoS for PCN. 
      Further, the unpredictable amount of competing-non-PCN-traffic 
      makes the PCN mechanisms less accurate and so reduces PCN's 
      ability to protect the QoS of admitted PCN-flows. 
 
   o  Two examples of such competing-non-PCN-traffic are: 
 
      1.  traffic that is priority scheduled over PCN (perhaps a 
          particular application or an operator's control messages); 
 
      2.  traffic that is scheduled at the same priority as PCN (for 
          example, if the Voice-Admit codepoint is used for PCN-traffic 
          [Moncaster09-1] and there is non-PCN, voice-admit traffic in 
          the PCN-domain). 
 
   o  If there is such competing-non-PCN-traffic, then PCN's mechanisms 
      should take account of it, in order to improve the accuracy of the 
      decision about whether to admit (or terminate) a PCN-flow.  For 
      example, one mechanism is that such competing-non-PCN-traffic 
      contributes to the PCN-meters (ie, is metered by the threshold- 
      marking and excess-traffic-marking algorithms). 
 
   o  There will be other non-PCN-traffic that doesn't compete for the 
      same forwarding bandwidth as PCN-traffic, because it is forwarded 
      at lower priority.  Hence, it shouldn't contribute to the PCN- 
      meters.  Examples are best-effort and assured-forwarding traffic. 
      However, a PCN-node should dedicate some capacity to lower- 
      priority traffic so that it isn't starved. 
 
   o  This document assumes that the PCN mechanisms are applied to a 
      single behaviour aggregate in the PCN-domain.  However, it would 
      also be possible to apply them independently to more than one 
      behaviour aggregate, which are distinguished by DSCP. 
 
3.6.  Backwards Compatibility 
 
   PCN specifies semantics for the ECN field that differ from the 
   default semantics of [RFC3168].  A particular PCN encoding scheme 
   needs to describe how it meets the guidelines of BCP 124 [RFC4774] 
   for specifying alternative semantics for the ECN field.  In summary, 
   the approach is to: 
 
   o  use a DSCP to allow PCN-nodes to distinguish PCN-traffic that uses 
      the alternative ECN semantics; 
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   o  define these semantics for use within a controlled region, the 
      PCN-domain; 
 
   o  take appropriate action if ECN-capable, non-PCN-traffic arrives at 
      a PCN-ingress-node with the DSCP used by PCN. 
 
   For the baseline encoding [Moncaster09-1], the "appropriate action" 
   is to block ECN-capable traffic that uses the same DSCP as PCN from 
   entering the PCN-domain directly.  "Blocking" means it is dropped or 
   downgraded to a lower-priority behaviour aggregate, or alternatively 
   such traffic may be tunnelled through the PCN-domain.  The reason 
   that "appropriate action" is needed is that the PCN-egress-node 
   clears the ECN field to 00. 
 
   Extended encoding schemes may need to take different "appropriate 
   action". 
 
4.  Detailed Functional Architecture 
 
   This section is intended to provide a systematic summary of the new 
   functional architecture in the PCN-domain.  First, it describes 
   functions needed at the three specific types of PCN-node; these are 
   data plane functions and are in addition to the normal router 
   functions for PCN-nodes.  Then, it describes the further 
   functionality needed for both flow admission control and flow 
   termination; these are signalling and decision-making functions, and 
   there are various possibilities for where the functions are 
   physically located.  The section is split into: 
 
   1.  functions needed at PCN-interior-nodes 
 
   2.  functions needed at PCN-ingress-nodes 
 
   3.  functions needed at PCN-egress-nodes 
 
   4.  other functions needed for flow admission control 
 
   5.  other functions needed for flow termination control 
 
   Note: Probing is covered in the Appendix. 
 
   The section then discusses some other detailed topics: 
 
   1.  addressing 
 
   2.  tunnelling 
 
   3.  fault handling 
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4.1.  PCN-Interior-Node Functions 
 
   Each link of the PCN-domain is configured with the following 
   functionality: 
 
   o  Behaviour aggregate classification - determine whether or not an 
      incoming packet is a PCN-packet. 
 
   o  PCN-meter - measure the "amount of PCN-traffic".  The measurement 
      is made on the overall PCN-traffic, not per flow.  Algorithms 
      determine whether to indicate to the PCN-marking functionality 
      that packets should be PCN-marked. 
 
   o  PCN-mark - as triggered by indications from the PCN-meter 
      functionality; if necessary, PCN-mark packets with the appropriate 
      encoding. 
 
   o  Drop - if the queue overflows, then naturally packets are dropped. 
      In addition, the link may be configured with a maximum rate for 
      PCN-traffic (below the physical link rate), above which PCN- 
      packets are dropped. 
 
   The functions are defined in [Eardley09] and the baseline encoding in 
   [Moncaster09-1] (extended encodings are to be defined in other 
   documents). 
 
                                       +---------+   Result 
                                    +->|Threshold|-------+ 
                                    |  |  Meter  |       | 
                                    |  +---------+       V 
         +----------+   +- - - - -+  |                +------+ 
         |   BA     |   |         |  |                |      |    Marked 
Packet =>|Classifier|==>| Dropper |==?===============>|Marker|==> Packet 
Stream   |          |   |         |  |                |      |    Stream 
         +----------+   +- - - - -+  |                +------+ 
                                    |  +---------+       ^ 
                                    |  | Excess  |       | 
                                    +->| Traffic |-------+ 
                                       |  Meter  |   Result 
                                       +---------+ 
 
   Figure 4: Schematic of PCN-interior-node functionality. 
 
4.2.  PCN-Ingress-Node Functions 
 
   Each ingress link of the PCN-domain is configured with the following 
   functionality: 
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   o  Packet classification - determine whether an incoming packet is 
      part of a previously admitted flow by using a filter spec (eg, 
      DSCP, source and destination addresses, port numbers, and 
      protocol). 
 
   o  Police - police, by dropping any packets received with a DSCP 
      indicating PCN transport that do not belong to an admitted flow. 
      (A prospective PCN-flow that is rejected could be blocked or 
      admitted into a lower-priority behaviour aggregate.)  Similarly, 
      police packets that are part of a previously admitted flow, to 
      check that the flow keeps to the agreed rate or flowspec (eg, see 
      [RFC1633] for a microflow and its NSIS equivalent). 
 
   o  PCN-colour - set the DSCP and ECN fields appropriately for the 
      PCN-domain, for example, as in [Moncaster09-1]. 
 
   o  Meter - some approaches to flow termination require the PCN- 
      ingress-node to measure the (aggregate) rate of PCN-traffic 
      towards a particular PCN-egress-node. 
 
   The first two are policing functions, needed to make sure that PCN- 
   packets admitted into the PCN-domain belong to a flow that has been 
   admitted and to ensure that the flow keeps to the flowspec agreed 
   (eg, doesn't exceed an agreed maximum rate and is inelastic traffic). 
   Installing the filter spec will typically be done by the signalling 
   protocol, as will re-installing the filter, for example, after a re- 
   route that changes the PCN-ingress-node (see [Briscoe06] for an 
   example using RSVP).  PCN-colouring allows the rest of the PCN-domain 
   to recognise PCN-packets. 
 
4.3.  PCN-Egress-Node Functions 
 
   Each egress link of the PCN-domain is configured with the following 
   functionality: 
 
   o  Packet classify - determine which PCN-ingress-node a PCN-packet 
      has come from. 
 
   o  Meter - "measure PCN-traffic" or "monitor PCN-marks". 
 
   o  PCN-colour - for PCN-packets, set the DSCP and ECN fields to the 
      appropriate values for use outside the PCN-domain. 
 
   The metering functionality, of course, depends on whether it is 
   targeted at admission control or flow termination.  Alternatives 
   involve the PCN-egress-node "measuring", as an aggregate (ie, not per 
   flow), all PCN-packets from a particular PCN-ingress-node, or 
   "monitoring" the PCN-traffic and reacting to one (or several) PCN- 
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   marked packets.  For PCN-colouring, [Moncaster09-1] specifies that 
   the PCN-egress-node resets the ECN field to 00; other encodings may 
   define different behaviour. 
 
4.4.  Admission Control Functions 
 
   As well as the functions covered above, other specific admission 
   control functions need to be performed (others might be possible): 
 
   o  Make decision about admission - based on the output of the PCN- 
      egress-node's meter function.  In the case where it "measures PCN- 
      traffic", the measured traffic on the ingress-egress-aggregate is 
      compared with some reference level.  In the case where it 
      "monitors PCN-marks", the decision is based on whether or not one 
      (or several) packets are PCN-marked (eg, the RSVP PATH message). 
      In either case, the admission decision also takes account of 
      policy and application-layer requirements [RFC2753]. 
 
   o  Communicate decision about admission - signal the decision to the 
      node making the admission control request (which may be outside 
      the PCN-domain) and to the policer (PCN-ingress-node function) for 
      enforcement of the decision. 
 
   There are various possibilities for how the functionality could be 
   distributed (we assume the operator will configure which is used): 
 
   o  The decision is made at the PCN-egress-node and the decision 
      (admit or block) is signalled to the PCN-ingress-node. 
 
   o  The decision is recommended by the PCN-egress-node (admit or 
      block), but the decision is definitively made by the PCN-ingress- 
      node.  The rationale is that the PCN-egress-node naturally has the 
      necessary information about the amount of PCN-marks on the 
      ingress-egress-aggregate, whereas the PCN-ingress-node is the 
      policy enforcement point [RFC2753] that polices incoming traffic 
      to ensure it is part of an admitted PCN-flow. 
 
   o  The decision is made at the PCN-ingress-node, which requires that 
      the PCN-egress-node signals PCN-feedback-information to the PCN- 
      ingress-node.  For example, it could signal the current fraction 
      of PCN-traffic that is PCN-marked. 
 
   o  The decision is made at a centralised node (see Appendix). 
 
   Note: Admission control functionality is not performed by normal PCN- 
   interior-nodes. 
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4.5.  Flow Termination Functions 
 
   As well as the functions covered above, other specific termination 
   control functions need to be performed (others might be possible): 
 
   o  PCN-meter at PCN-egress-node - similarly to flow admission, there 
      are two types of possibilities: to "measure PCN-traffic" on the 
      ingress-egress-aggregate, or to "monitor PCN-marks" and react to 
      one (or several) PCN-marks. 
 
   o  (if required) PCN-meter at PCN-ingress-node - make "measurements 
      of PCN-traffic" being sent towards a particular PCN-egress-node; 
      again, this is done for the ingress-egress-aggregate and not per 
      flow. 
 
   o  (if required) Communicate PCN-feedback-information to the node 
      that makes the flow termination decision - for example, as in 
      [Briscoe06], communicate the PCN-egress-node's measurements to the 
      PCN-ingress-node. 
 
   o  Make decision about flow termination - use the information from 
      the PCN-meter(s) to decide which PCN-flow or PCN-flows to 
      terminate.  The decision takes account of policy and application- 
      layer requirements [RFC2753]. 
 
   o  Communicate decision about flow termination - signal the decision 
      to the node that is able to terminate the flow (which may be 
      outside the PCN-domain) and to the policer (PCN-ingress-node 
      function) for enforcement of the decision. 
 
   There are various possibilities for how the functionality could be 
   distributed, similar to those discussed above in Section 4.4. 
 
   Note: Flow termination functionality is not performed by normal PCN- 
   interior-nodes. 
 
4.6.  Addressing 
 
   PCN-nodes may need to know the address of other PCN-nodes.  Note that 
   PCN-interior-nodes don't need to know the address of other PCN-nodes 
   (except their next-hop neighbours for routing purposes). 
 
   At a minimum, the PCN-egress-node needs to know the address of the 
   PCN-ingress-node associated with a flow so that the PCN-ingress-node 
   can be informed of the admission decision (and any flow termination 
   decision) and enforce it through policing.  There are various 
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   possibilities for how the PCN-egress-node can do this, ie, associate 
   the received packet to the correct ingress-egress-aggregate.  It is 
   not the intention of this document to mandate a particular mechanism. 
 
   o  The addressing information can be gathered from signalling -- for 
      example, through the regular processing of an RSVP PATH message, 
      as the PCN-ingress-node is the previous RSVP hop (PHOP) 
      ([Lefaucheur06]).  Another option is that the PCN-ingress-node 
      could signal its address to the PCN-egress-node. 
 
   o  Always tunnel PCN-traffic across the PCN-domain.  Then the PCN- 
      ingress-node's address is simply the source address of the outer 
      packet header.  The PCN-ingress-node needs to learn the address of 
      the PCN-egress-node, either by manual configuration or by one of 
      the automated tunnel endpoint discovery mechanisms (such as 
      signalling or probing over the data route, interrogating routing, 
      or using a centralised broker). 
 
4.7.  Tunnelling 
 
   Tunnels may originate and/or terminate within a PCN-domain (eg, IP 
   over IP, IP over MPLS).  It is important that the PCN-marking of any 
   packet can potentially influence PCN's flow admission control and 
   termination -- it shouldn't matter whether the packet happens to be 
   tunnelled at the PCN-node that PCN-marks the packet, or indeed 
   whether it's decapsulated or encapsulated by a subsequent PCN-node. 
   This suggests that the "uniform conceptual model" described in 
   [RFC2983] should be re-applied in the PCN context.  In line with both 
   this and the approach of [RFC4303] and [Briscoe09], the following 
   rule is applied if encapsulation is done within the PCN-domain: 
 
   o  Any PCN-marking is copied into the outer header. 
 
   Note: A tunnel will not provide this behaviour if it complies with 
   [RFC3168] tunnelling in either mode, but it will if it complies with 
   [RFC4301] IPsec tunnelling. 
 
   Similarly, in line with the "uniform conceptual model" of [RFC2983], 
   with the "full-functionality option" of [RFC3168], and with 
   [RFC4301], the following rule is applied if decapsulation is done 
   within the PCN-domain: 
 
   o  If the outer header's marking state is more severe, then it is 
      copied onto the inner header. 
 
   Note that the order of increasing severity is: not PCN-marked, 
   threshold-marked, and excess-traffic-marked. 
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   An operator may wish to tunnel PCN-traffic from PCN-ingress-nodes to 
   PCN-egress-nodes.  The PCN-marks shouldn't be visible outside the 
   PCN-domain, which can be achieved by the PCN-egress-node doing the 
   PCN-colouring function (Section 4.3) after all the other (PCN and 
   tunnelling) functions.  The potential reasons for doing such 
   tunnelling are: the PCN-egress-node then automatically knows the 
   address of the relevant PCN-ingress-node for a flow, and, even if 
   ECMP (Equal Cost Multi-Path) is running, all PCN-packets on a 
   particular ingress-egress-aggregate follow the same path (for more on 
   ECMP, see Section 6.4).  But such tunnelling also has drawbacks, for 
   example, the additional overhead in terms of bandwidth and processing 
   as well as the cost of setting up a mesh of tunnels between PCN- 
   boundary-nodes (there is an N^2 scaling issue). 
 
   Potential issues arise for a "partially PCN-capable tunnel", ie, 
   where only one tunnel endpoint is in the PCN-domain: 
 
   1.  The tunnel originates outside a PCN-domain and ends inside it. 
       If the packet arrives at the tunnel ingress with the same 
       encoding as used within the PCN-domain to indicate PCN-marking, 
       then this could lead the PCN-egress-node to falsely measure pre- 
       congestion. 
 
   2.  The tunnel originates inside a PCN-domain and ends outside it. 
       If the packet arrives at the tunnel ingress already PCN-marked, 
       then it will still have the same encoding when it's decapsulated, 
       which could potentially confuse nodes beyond the tunnel egress. 
 
   In line with the solution for partially capable Diffserv tunnels in 
   [RFC2983], the following rules are applied: 
 
   o  For case (1), the tunnel egress node clears any PCN-marking on the 
      inner header.  This rule is applied before the "copy on 
      decapsulation" rule above. 
 
   o  For case (2), the tunnel ingress node clears any PCN-marking on 
      the inner header.  This rule is applied after the "copy on 
      encapsulation" rule above. 
 
   Note that the above implies that one has to know, or determine, the 
   characteristics of the other end of the tunnel as part of 
   establishing it. 
 
   Tunnelling constraints were a major factor in the choice of the 
   baseline encoding.  As explained in [Moncaster09-1], with current 
   tunnelling endpoints, only the 11 codepoint of the ECN field survives 
   decapsulation, and hence the baseline encoding only uses the 11 
   codepoint to indicate PCN-marking.  Extended encoding schemes need to 
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   explain their interactions with (or assumptions about) tunnelling.  A 
   lengthy discussion of all the issues associated with layered 
   encapsulation of congestion notification (for ECN as well as PCN) is 
   in [Briscoe09]. 
 
4.8.  Fault Handling 
 
   If a PCN-interior-node (or one of its links) fails, then lower-layer 
   protection mechanisms or the regular IP routing protocol will 
   eventually re-route around it.  If the new route can carry all the 
   admitted traffic, flows will gracefully continue.  If instead this 
   causes early warning of pre-congestion on the new route, then 
   admission control based on Pre-Congestion Notification will ensure 
   that new flows will not be admitted until enough existing flows have 
   departed.  Re-routing may result in heavy (pre-)congestion, which 
   will cause the flow termination mechanism to kick in. 
 
   If a PCN-boundary-node fails, then we would like the regular QoS 
   signalling protocol to be responsible for taking appropriate action. 
   As an example, [Briscoe09] considers what happens if RSVP is the QoS 
   signalling protocol. 
 
5.  Operations and Management 
 
   This section considers operations and management issues, under the 
   FCAPS headings: Faults, Configuration, Accounting, Performance, and 
   Security.  Provisioning is discussed with performance. 
 
5.1.  Fault Operations and Management 
 
   Fault Operations and Management is about preventing faults, telling 
   the management system (or manual operator) that the system has 
   recovered (or not) from a failure, and about maintaining information 
   to aid fault diagnosis. 
 
   Admission blocking and, particularly, flow termination mechanisms 
   should rarely be needed in practice.  It would be unfortunate if they 
   didn't work after an option had been accidentally disabled. 
   Therefore, it will be necessary to regularly test that the live 
   system works as intended (devising a meaningful test is left as an 
   exercise for the operator). 
 
   Section 4 describes how the PCN architecture has been designed to 
   ensure admitted flows continue gracefully after recovering 
   automatically from link or node failures.  The need to record and 
   monitor re-routing events affecting signalling is unchanged by the 
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   addition of PCN to a Diffserv domain.  Similarly, re-routing events 
   within the PCN-domain will be recorded and monitored just as they 
   would be without PCN. 
 
   PCN-marking does make it possible to record "near-misses".  For 
   instance, at the PCN-egress-node a "reporting threshold" could be set 
   to monitor how often -- and for how long -- the system comes close to 
   triggering flow blocking without actually doing so.  Similarly, 
   bursts of flow termination marking could be recorded even if they are 
   not sufficiently sustained to trigger flow termination.  Such 
   statistics could be correlated with per-queue counts of marking 
   volume (Section 5.2) to upgrade resources in danger of causing 
   service degradation or to trigger manual tracing of intermittent 
   incipient errors that would otherwise have gone unnoticed. 
 
   Finally, of course, many faults are caused by failings in the 
   management process ("human error"): a wrongly configured address in a 
   node, a wrong address given in a signalling protocol, a wrongly 
   configured parameter in a queueing algorithm, a node set into a 
   different mode from other nodes, and so on.  Generally, a clean 
   design with few configurable options ensures this class of faults can 
   be traced more easily and prevented more often.  Sound management 
   practice at run-time also helps.  For instance, a management system 
   should be used that constrains configuration changes within system 
   rules (eg, preventing an option setting inconsistent with other 
   nodes), configuration options should be recorded in an offline 
   database, and regular automatic consistency checks between live 
   systems and the database should be performed.  PCN adds nothing 
   specific to this class of problems. 
 
5.2.  Configuration Operations and Management 
 
   Threshold-metering and -marking and excess-traffic-metering and 
   -marking are standardised in [Eardley09].  However, more diversity in 
   PCN-boundary-node behaviours is expected, in order to interface with 
   diverse industry architectures.  It may be possible to have different 
   PCN-boundary-node behaviours for different ingress-egress-aggregates 
   within the same PCN-domain. 
 
   PCN-metering behaviour is enabled on either the egress or the ingress 
   interfaces of PCN-nodes.  A consistent choice must be made across the 
   PCN-domain to ensure that the PCN mechanisms protect all links. 
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   PCN configuration control variables fall into the following 
   categories: 
 
   o  system options (enabling or disabling behaviours) 
 
   o  parameters (setting levels, addresses, etc.) 
 
   One possibility is that all configurable variables sit within an SNMP 
   (Simple Network Management Protocol) management framework [RFC3411], 
   being structured within a defined management information base (MIB) 
   on each node, and being remotely readable and settable via a suitably 
   secure management protocol (such as SNMPv3). 
 
   Some configuration options and parameters have to be set once to 
   "globally" control the whole PCN-domain.  Where possible, these are 
   identified below.  This may affect operational complexity and the 
   chances of interoperability problems between equipment from different 
   vendors. 
 
   It may be possible for an operator to configure some PCN-interior- 
   nodes so that they don't run the PCN mechanisms, if it knows that 
   these links will never become (pre-)congested. 
 
5.2.1.  System Options 
 
   On PCN-interior-nodes there will be very few system options: 
 
   o  Whether two PCN-markings (threshold-marked and excess-traffic- 
      marked) are enabled or only one.  Typically, all nodes throughout 
      a PCN-domain will be configured the same in this respect. 
      However, exceptions could be made.  For example, if most PCN-nodes 
      used both markings but some legacy hardware was incapable of 
      running two algorithms, an operator might be willing to configure 
      these legacy nodes solely for excess-traffic-marking to enable 
      flow termination as a back-stop.  It would be sensible to place 
      such nodes where they could be provisioned with a greater leeway 
      over expected traffic levels. 
 
   o  In the case where only one PCN-marking is enabled, all nodes must 
      be configured to generate PCN-marks from the same meter (ie, 
      either the threshold meter or the excess-traffic meter). 
 
   PCN-boundary-nodes (ingress and egress) will have more system 
   options: 
 
   o  Which of admission and flow termination are enabled.  If any PCN- 
      interior-node is configured to generate a marking, all PCN- 
      boundary-nodes must be able to interpret that marking (which 
 
 
 
Eardley                      Informational                     [Page 27] 
 
RFC 5559                    PCN Architecture                   June 2009 
 
 
      includes understanding, in a PCN-domain that uses only one type of 
      PCN-marking, whether they are generated by PCN-interior-nodes' 
      threshold meters or their excess-traffic meters).  Therefore, all 
      PCN-boundary-nodes must be configured the same in this respect. 
 
   o  Where flow admission and termination decisions are made: at PCN- 
      ingress-nodes or at PCN-egress-nodes (or at a centralised node, 
      see Appendix).  Theoretically, this configuration choice could be 
      negotiated for each pair of PCN-boundary-nodes, but we cannot 
      imagine why such complexity would be required, except perhaps in 
      future inter-domain scenarios. 
 
   o  How PCN-markings are translated into admission control and flow 
      termination decisions (see Sections 3.1 and 3.2). 
 
   PCN-egress-nodes will have further system options: 
 
   o  How the mapping should be established between each packet and its 
      aggregate (eg, by MPLS label and by IP packet filter spec) and how 
      to take account of ECMP. 
 
   o  If an equipment vendor provides a choice, there may be options for 
      selecting which smoothing algorithm to use for measurements. 
 
5.2.2.  Parameters 
 
   Like any Diffserv domain, every node within a PCN-domain will need to 
   be configured with the DSCP(s) used to identify PCN-packets.  On each 
   interior link, the main configuration parameters are the PCN- 
   threshold-rate and PCN-excess-rate.  A larger PCN-threshold-rate 
   enables more PCN-traffic to be admitted on a link, hence improving 
   capacity utilisation.  A PCN-excess-rate set further above the PCN- 
   threshold-rate allows greater increases in traffic (whether due to 
   natural fluctuations or some unexpected event) before any flows are 
   terminated, ie, minimises the chances of unnecessarily triggering the 
   termination mechanism.  For instance, an operator may want to design 
   their network so that it can cope with a failure of any single PCN- 
   node without terminating any flows. 
 
   Setting these rates on the first deployment of PCN will be very 
   similar to the traditional process for sizing an admission-controlled 
   network, depending on: the operator's requirements for minimising 
   flow blocking (grade of service), the expected PCN-traffic load on 
   each link and its statistical characteristics (the traffic matrix), 
   contingency for re-routing the PCN-traffic matrix in the event of 
   single or multiple failures, and the expected load from other classes 
   relative to link capacities [Menth09-1].  But, once a domain is in 
   operation, a PCN design goal is to be able to determine growth in 
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   these configured rates much more simply, by monitoring PCN-marking 
   rates from actual rather than expected traffic (see Section 5.4 on 
   Performance and Provisioning). 
 
   Operators may also wish to configure a rate greater than the PCN- 
   excess-rate that is the absolute maximum rate that a link allows for 
   PCN-traffic.  This may simply be the physical link rate, but some 
   operators may wish to configure a logical limit to prevent starvation 
   of other traffic classes during any brief period after PCN-traffic 
   exceeds the PCN-excess-rate but before flow termination brings it 
   back below this rate. 
 
   Threshold-metering requires a threshold token bucket depth to be 
   configured, excess-traffic-metering requires a value for the MTU 
   (maximum size of a PCN-packet on the link), and both require setting 
   a maximum size of their token buckets.  It is preferable to have 
   rules that set defaults for these parameters but to then allow 
   operators to change them -- for instance, if average traffic 
   characteristics change over time. 
 
   The PCN-egress-node may allow configuration of: 
 
   o  how it smooths metering of PCN-markings (eg, EWMA parameters) 
 
   Whichever node makes admission and flow termination decisions will 
   contain algorithms for converting PCN-marking levels into admission 
   or flow termination decisions.  These will also require configurable 
   parameters, for instance: 
 
   o  An admission control algorithm that is based on the fraction of 
      marked packets will at least require a marking threshold setting 
      above which it denies admission to new flows. 
 
   o  Flow termination algorithms will probably require a parameter to 
      delay termination of any flows until it is more certain that an 
      anomalous event is not transient. 
 
   o  A parameter to control the trade-off between how quickly excess 
      flows are terminated and over-termination. 
 
   One particular approach [Charny07-2] would require a global parameter 
   to be defined on all PCN-nodes, but would only need one PCN-marking 
   rate to be configured on each link.  The global parameter is a 
   scaling factor between admission and termination (the rate of PCN- 
   traffic on a link up to which flows are admitted vs. the rate above 
   which flows are terminated).  [Charny07-2] discusses in full the 
   impact of this particular approach on the operation of PCN. 
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5.3.  Accounting Operations and Management 
 
   Accounting is only done at trust boundaries so it is out of scope of 
   this document, which is confined to intra-domain issues.  Use of PCN 
   internal to a domain makes no difference to the flow signalling 
   events crossing trust boundaries outside the PCN-domain, which are 
   typically used for accounting. 
 
5.4.  Performance and Provisioning Operations and Management 
 
   Monitoring of performance factors measurable from *outside* the PCN- 
   domain will be no different with PCN than with any other packet- 
   based, flow admission control system, both at the flow level 
   (blocking probability, etc.) and the packet level (jitter [RFC3393], 
   [Y.1541], loss rate [RFC4656], mean opinion score [P.800], etc.). 
   The difference is that PCN is intentionally designed to indicate 
   *internally* which exact resource(s) are the cause of performance 
   problems and by how much. 
 
   Even better, PCN indicates which resources will probably cause 
   problems if they are not upgraded soon.  This can be achieved by the 
   management system monitoring the total amount (in bytes) of PCN- 
   marking generated by each queue over a period.  Given possible long 
   provisioning lead times, pre-congestion volume is the best metric to 
   reveal whether sufficient persistent demand has occurred to warrant 
   an upgrade because, even before utilisation becomes problematic, the 
   statistical variability of traffic will cause occasional bursts of 
   pre-congestion.  This "early warning system" decouples the process of 
   adding customers from the provisioning process.  This should cut the 
   time to add a customer when compared against admission control that 
   is provided over native Diffserv [RFC2998] because it saves having to 
   verify the capacity-planning process before adding each customer. 
 
   Alternatively, before triggering an upgrade, the long-term pre- 
   congestion volume on each link can be used to balance traffic load 
   across the PCN-domain by adjusting the link weights of the routing 
   system.  When an upgrade to a link's configured PCN-rates is 
   required, it may also be necessary to upgrade the physical capacity 
   available to other classes.  However, there will usually be 
   sufficient physical capacity for the upgrade to go ahead as a simple 
   configuration change.  Alternatively, [Songhurst06] describes an 
   adaptive rather than preconfigured system, where the configured PCN- 
   threshold-rate is replaced with a high and low water mark and the 
   marking algorithm automatically optimises how physical capacity is 
   shared, using the relative loads from PCN and other traffic classes. 
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   All the above processes require just three extra counters associated 
   with each PCN queue: threshold-markings, excess-traffic-markings, and 
   drops.  Every time a PCN-packet is marked or dropped, its size in 
   bytes should be added to the appropriate counter.  Then the 
   management system can read the counters at any time and subtract a 
   previous reading to establish the incremental volume of each type of 
   (pre-)congestion.  Readings should be taken frequently so that 
   anomalous events (eg, re-routes) can be distinguished from regular 
   fluctuating demand, if required. 
 
5.5.  Security Operations and Management 
 
   Security Operations and Management is about using secure operational 
   practices as well as being able to track security breaches or near- 
   misses at run-time.  PCN adds few specifics to the general good 
   practice required in this field [RFC4778].  The correct functions of 
   the system should be monitored (Section 5.4) in multiple independent 
   ways and correlated to detect possible security breaches.  Persistent 
   (pre-)congestion marking should raise an alarm (both on the node 
   doing the marking and on the PCN-egress-node metering it). 
   Similarly, persistently poor external QoS metrics (such as jitter or 
   mean opinion score) should raise an alarm.  The following are 
   examples of symptoms that may be the result of innocent faults, 
   rather than attacks; however, until diagnosed, they should be logged 
   and should trigger a security alarm: 
 
   o  Anomalous patterns of non-conforming incoming signals and packets 
      rejected at the PCN-ingress-nodes (eg, packets already marked PCN- 
      capable or traffic persistently starving token bucket policers). 
 
   o  PCN-capable packets arriving at a PCN-egress-node with no 
      associated state for mapping them to a valid ingress-egress- 
      aggregate. 
 
   o  A PCN-ingress-node receiving feedback signals that are about the 
      pre-congestion level on a non-existent aggregate or that are 
      inconsistent with other signals (eg, unexpected sequence numbers, 
      inconsistent addressing, conflicting reports of the pre-congestion 
      level, etc.). 
 
   o  Pre-congestion marking arriving at a PCN-egress-node with 
      (pre-)congestion markings focused on particular flows, rather than 
      randomly distributed throughout the aggregate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eardley                      Informational                     [Page 31] 
 
RFC 5559                    PCN Architecture                   June 2009 
 
 
6.  Applicability of PCN 
 
6.1.  Benefits 
 
   The key benefits of the PCN mechanisms are that they are simple, 
   scalable, and robust, because: 
 
   o  Per-flow state is only required at the PCN-ingress-nodes 
      ("stateless core").  This is required for policing purposes (to 
      prevent non-admitted PCN-traffic from entering the PCN-domain) and 
      so on.  It is not generally required that other network entities 
      are aware of individual flows (although they may be in particular 
      deployment scenarios). 
 
   o  Admission control is resilient: with PCN, QoS is decoupled from 
      the routing system.  Hence, in general, admitted flows can survive 
      capacity, routing, or topology changes without additional 
      signalling.  The PCN-admissible-rate on each link can be chosen to 
      be small enough that admitted traffic can still be carried after a 
      re-routing in most failure cases [Menth09-1].  This is an 
      important feature, as QoS violations in core networks due to link 
      failures are more likely than QoS violations due to increased 
      traffic volume [Iyer03]. 
 
   o  The PCN-metering behaviours only operate on the overall PCN- 
      traffic on the link, not per flow. 
 
   o  The information of these measurements is signalled to the PCN- 
      egress-nodes by the PCN-marks in the packet headers, ie, "in- 
      band".  No additional signalling protocol is required for 
      transporting the PCN-marks.  Therefore, no secure binding is 
      required between data packets and separate congestion messages. 
 
   o  The PCN-egress-nodes make separate measurements, operating on the 
      aggregate PCN-traffic from each PCN-ingress-node, ie, not per 
      flow.  Similarly, signalling by the PCN-egress-node of PCN- 
      feedback-information (which is used for flow admission and 
      termination decisions) is at the granularity of the ingress- 
      egress-aggregate.  An alternative approach is that the PCN-egress- 
      nodes monitor the PCN-traffic and signal PCN-feedback-information 
      (which is used for flow admission and termination decisions) at 
      the granularity of one (or a few) PCN-marks. 
 
   o  The admitted PCN-load is controlled dynamically.  Therefore, it 
      adapts as the traffic matrix changes.  It also adapts if the 
      network topology changes (eg, after a link failure).  Hence, an 
      operator can be less conservative when deploying network capacity 
      and less accurate in their prediction of the PCN-traffic matrix. 
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   o  The termination mechanism complements admission control.  It 
      allows the network to recover from sudden unexpected surges of 
      PCN-traffic on some links, thus restoring QoS to the remaining 
      flows.  Such scenarios are expected to be rare but not impossible. 
      They can be caused by large network failures that redirect lots of 
      admitted PCN-traffic to other links or by the malfunction of 
      measurement-based admission control in the presence of admitted 
      flows that send for a while with an atypically low rate and then 
      increase their rates in a correlated way. 
 
   o  Flow termination can also enable an operator to be less 
      conservative when deploying network capacity.  It is an 
      alternative to running links at low utilisation in order to 
      protect against link or node failures.  This is especially the 
      case with SRLGs (shared risk link groups), which are links that 
      share a resource, such as a fibre, whose failure affects all links 
      in that group [RFC4216]).  Fully protecting traffic against a 
      single SRLG failure requires low utilisation (~10%) of the link 
      bandwidth on some links before failure [Charny08]. 
 
   o  The PCN-supportable-rate may be set below the maximum rate that 
      PCN-traffic can be transmitted on a link in order to trigger the 
      termination of some PCN-flows before loss (or excessive delay) of 
      PCN-packets occurs, or to keep the maximum PCN-load on a link 
      below a level configured by the operator. 
 
   o  Provisioning of the network is decoupled from the process of 
      adding new customers.  By contrast, with the Diffserv architecture 
      [RFC2475], operators rely on subscription-time Service Level 
      Agreements, which statically define the parameters of the traffic 
      that will be accepted from a customer.  This way, the operator has 
      to verify that provision is sufficient each time a new customer is 
      added to check that the Service Level Agreement can be fulfilled. 
      A PCN-domain doesn't need such traffic conditioning. 
 
6.2.  Deployment Scenarios 
 
   Operators of networks will want to use the PCN mechanisms in various 
   arrangements depending, for instance, on how they are performing 
   admission control outside the PCN-domain (users after all are 
   concerned about QoS end-to-end), what their particular goals and 
   assumptions are, how many PCN encoding states are available, and so 
   on. 
 
   A PCN-domain may have three encoding states (or pedantically, an 
   operator may choose to use up three encoding states for PCN): not 
   PCN-marked, threshold-marked, and excess-traffic-marked.  This way, 
   both PCN admission control and flow termination can be supported.  As 
 
 
 
Eardley                      Informational                     [Page 33] 
 
RFC 5559                    PCN Architecture                   June 2009 
 
 
   illustrated in Figure 1, admission control accepts new flows until 
   the PCN-traffic rate on the bottleneck link rises above the PCN- 
   threshold-rate, whilst, if necessary, the flow termination mechanism 
   terminates flows down to the PCN-excess-rate on the bottleneck link. 
 
   On the other hand, a PCN-domain may have two encoding states (as in 
   [Moncaster09-1]) (or pedantically, an operator may choose to use up 
   two encoding states for PCN): not PCN-marked and PCN-marked.  This 
   way, there are three possibilities, as discussed in the following 
   paragraphs (see also Section 3.3). 
 
   First, an operator could just use PCN's admission control, solving 
   heavy congestion (caused by re-routing) by "just waiting" -- as 
   sessions end, PCN-traffic naturally reduces; meanwhile, the admission 
   control mechanism will prevent admission of new flows that use the 
   affected links.  So, the PCN-domain will naturally return to normal 
   operation, but with reduced capacity.  The drawback of this approach 
   would be that, until sufficient sessions have ended to relieve the 
   congestion, all PCN-flows as well as lower-priority services will be 
   adversely affected. 
 
   Second, an operator could just rely on statically provisioned 
   capacity per PCN-ingress-node (regardless of the PCN-egress-node of a 
   flow) for admission control, as is typical in the hose model of the 
   Diffserv architecture [Kumar01].  Such traffic-conditioning 
   agreements can lead to focused overload: many flows happen to focus 
   on a particular link and then all flows through the congested link 
   fail catastrophically.  PCN's flow termination mechanism could then 
   be used to counteract such a problem. 
 
   Third, both admission control and flow termination can be triggered 
   from the single type of PCN-marking; the main downside here is that 
   admission control is less accurate [Charny07-2].  This possibility is 
   illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
   Within the PCN-domain, there is some flexibility about how the 
   decision-making functionality is distributed.  These possibilities 
   are outlined in Section 4.4 and are also discussed elsewhere, such as 
   in [Menth09-2]. 
 
   The flow admission and termination decisions need to be enforced 
   through per-flow policing by the PCN-ingress-nodes.  If there are 
   several PCN-domains on the end-to-end path, then each needs to police 
   at its PCN-ingress-nodes.  One exception is if the operator runs both 
   the access network (not a PCN-domain) and the core network (a PCN- 
   domain); per-flow policing could be devolved to the access network 
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   and not be done at the PCN-ingress-node.  Note that, to aid 
   readability, the rest of this document assumes that policing is done 
   by the PCN-ingress-nodes. 
 
   PCN admission control has to fit with the overall approach to 
   admission control.  For instance, [Briscoe06] describes the case 
   where RSVP signalling runs end-to-end.  The PCN-domain is a single 
   RSVP hop, ie, only the PCN-boundary-nodes process RSVP messages, with 
   RSVP messages processed on each hop outside the PCN-domain, as in 
   IntServ over Diffserv [RFC2998].  It would also be possible for the 
   RSVP signalling to be originated and/or terminated by proxies, with 
   application-layer signalling between the end user and the proxy (eg, 
   SIP signalling with a home hub).  A similar example would use NSIS 
   (Next Steps in Signalling) [RFC3726] instead of RSVP. 
 
   It is possible that a user wants its inelastic traffic to use the PCN 
   mechanisms but also react to ECN markings outside the PCN-domain 
   [Sarker08].  Two possible ways to do this are to tunnel all PCN- 
   packets across the PCN-domain, so that the ECN marks are carried 
   transparently across the PCN-domain, or to use an encoding like 
   [Moncaster09-2].  Tunnelling is discussed further in Section 4.7. 
 
   Some further possible deployment models are outlined in the Appendix. 
 
6.3.  Assumptions and Constraints on Scope 
 
   The scope of this document is restricted by the following 
   assumptions: 
 
   1.  These components are deployed in a single Diffserv domain, within 
       which all PCN-nodes are PCN-enabled and are trusted for truthful 
       PCN-marking and transport. 
 
   2.  All flows handled by these mechanisms are inelastic and 
       constrained to a known peak rate through policing or shaping. 
 
   3.  The number of PCN-flows across any potential bottleneck link is 
       sufficiently large that stateless, statistical mechanisms can be 
       effective.  To put it another way, the aggregate bit rate of PCN- 
       traffic across any potential bottleneck link needs to be 
       sufficiently large, relative to the maximum additional bit rate 
       added by one flow.  This is the basic assumption of measurement- 
       based admission control. 
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   4.  PCN-flows may have different precedence, but the applicability of 
       the PCN mechanisms for emergency use (911, GETS (Government 
       Telecommunications Service), WPS (Wireless Priority Service), 
       MLPP (Multilevel Precedence and Premption), etc.) is out of 
       scope. 
 
6.3.1.  Assumption 1: Trust and Support of PCN - Controlled Environment 
 
   It is assumed that the PCN-domain is a controlled environment, ie, 
   all the nodes in a PCN-domain run PCN and are trusted.  There are 
   several reasons for this assumption: 
 
   o  The PCN-domain has to be encircled by a ring of PCN-boundary- 
      nodes; otherwise, traffic could enter a PCN-BA without being 
      subject to admission control, which would potentially degrade the 
      QoS of existing PCN-flows. 
 
   o  Similarly, a PCN-boundary-node has to trust that all the PCN-nodes 
      mark PCN-traffic consistently.  A node not performing PCN-marking 
      wouldn't be able to send an alert when it suffered pre-congestion, 
      which potentially would lead to too many PCN-flows being admitted 
      (or too few being terminated).  Worse, a rogue node could perform 
      various attacks, as discussed in Section 7. 
 
   One way of assuring the above two points are in effect is to have the 
   entire PCN-domain run by a single operator.  Another way is to have 
   several operators that trust each other in their handling of PCN- 
   traffic. 
 
   Note: All PCN-nodes need to be trustworthy.  However, if it is known 
   that an interface cannot become pre-congested, then it is not 
   strictly necessary for it to be capable of PCN-marking, but this must 
   be known even in unusual circumstances, eg, after the failure of some 
   links. 
 
6.3.2.  Assumption 2: Real-Time Applications 
 
   It is assumed that any variation of source bit rate is independent of 
   the level of pre-congestion.  We assume that PCN-packets come from 
   real-time applications generating inelastic traffic, ie, sending 
   packets at the rate the codec produces them, regardless of the 
   availability of capacity [RFC4594].  Examples of such real-time 
   applications include voice and video requiring low delay, jitter, and 
   packet loss, the Controlled Load Service [RFC2211], and the Telephony 
   service class [RFC4594].  This assumption is to help focus the effort 
   where it looks like PCN would be most useful, ie, the sorts of 
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   applications where per-flow QoS is a known requirement.  In other 
   words, we focus on PCN providing a benefit to inelastic traffic (PCN 
   may or may not provide a benefit to other types of traffic). 
 
   As a consequence, it is assumed that PCN-metering and PCN-marking is 
   being applied to traffic scheduled with an expedited forwarding per- 
   hop behaviour [RFC3246] or with a per-hop behaviour with similar 
   characteristics. 
 
6.3.3.  Assumption 3: Many Flows and Additional Load 
 
   It is assumed that there are many PCN-flows on any bottleneck link in 
   the PCN-domain (or, to put it another way, the aggregate bit rate of 
   PCN-traffic across any potential bottleneck link is sufficiently 
   large, relative to the maximum additional bit rate added by one PCN- 
   flow).  Measurement-based admission control assumes that the present 
   is a reasonable prediction of the future: the network conditions are 
   measured at the time of a new flow request, but the actual network 
   performance must be acceptable during the call some time later.  One 
   issue is that if there are only a few variable rate flows, then the 
   aggregate traffic level may vary a lot, perhaps enough to cause some 
   packets to get dropped.  If there are many flows, then the aggregate 
   traffic level should be statistically smoothed.  How many flows is 
   enough depends on a number of factors, such as the variation in each 
   flow's rate, the total rate of PCN-traffic, and the size of the 
   "safety margin" between the traffic level at which we start 
   admission-marking and at which packets are dropped or significantly 
   delayed. 
 
   No explicit assumptions are made about how many PCN-flows are in each 
   ingress-egress-aggregate.  Performance-evaluation work may clarify 
   whether it is necessary to make any additional assumptions on 
   aggregation at the ingress-egress-aggregate level. 
 
6.3.4.  Assumption 4: Emergency Use Out of Scope 
 
   PCN-flows may have different precedence, but the applicability of the 
   PCN mechanisms for emergency use (911, GETS, WPS, MLPP, etc.) is out 
   of scope for this document. 
 
6.4.  Challenges 
 
   Prior work on PCN and similar mechanisms has led to a number of 
   considerations about PCN's design goals (things PCN should be good 
   at) and some issues that have been hard to solve in a fully 
   satisfactory manner.  Taken as a whole, PCN represents a list of 
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   trade-offs (it is unlikely that they can all be 100% achieved) and 
   perhaps a list of evaluation criteria to help an operator (or the 
   IETF) decide between options. 
 
   The following are open issues.  They are mainly taken from 
   [Briscoe06], which also describes some possible solutions.  Note that 
   some may be considered unimportant in general or in specific 
   deployment scenarios, or by some operators. 
 
   Note: Potential solutions are out of scope for this document. 
 
   o  ECMP (Equal Cost Multi-Path) Routing: The level of pre-congestion 
      is measured on a specific ingress-egress-aggregate.  However, if 
      the PCN-domain runs ECMP, then traffic on this ingress-egress- 
      aggregate may follow several different paths -- some of the paths 
      could be pre-congested whilst others are not.  There are three 
      potential problems: 
 
      1.  over-admission: a new flow is admitted (because the pre- 
          congestion level measured by the PCN-egress-node is 
          sufficiently diluted by unmarked packets from non-congested 
          paths that a new flow is admitted), but its packets travel 
          through a pre-congested PCN-node. 
 
      2.  under-admission: a new flow is blocked (because the pre- 
          congestion level measured by the PCN-egress-node is 
          sufficiently increased by PCN-marked packets from pre- 
          congested paths that a new flow is blocked), but its packets 
          travel along an uncongested path. 
 
      3.  ineffective termination: a flow is terminated but its path 
          doesn't travel through the (pre-)congested router(s).  Since 
          flow termination is a "last resort", which protects the 
          network should over-admission occur, this problem is probably 
          more important to solve than the other two. 
 
   o  ECMP and Signalling: It is possible that, in a PCN-domain running 
      ECMP, the signalling packets (eg, RSVP, NSIS) follow a different 
      path than the data packets, which could matter if the signalling 
      packets are used as probes.  Whether this is an issue depends on 
      which fields the ECMP algorithm uses; if the ECMP algorithm is 
      restricted to the source and destination IP addresses, then it 
      will not be an issue.  ECMP and signalling interactions are a 
      specific instance of a general issue for non-traditional routing 
      combined with resource management along a path [Hancock02]. 
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   o  Tunnelling: There are scenarios where tunnelling makes it 
      difficult to determine the path in the PCN-domain.  The problem, 
      its impact, and the potential solutions are similar to those for 
      ECMP. 
 
   o  Scenarios with only one tunnel endpoint in the PCN-domain: Such 
      scenarios may make it harder for the PCN-egress-node to gather 
      from the signalling messages (eg, RSVP, NSIS) the identity of the 
      PCN-ingress-node. 
 
   o  Bi-Directional Sessions: Many applications have bi-directional 
      sessions -- hence, there are two microflows that should be 
      admitted (or terminated) as a pair -- for instance, a bi- 
      directional voice call only makes sense if microflows in both 
      directions are admitted.  However, the PCN mechanisms concern 
      admission and termination of a single flow, and coordination of 
      the decision for both flows is a matter for the signalling 
      protocol and out of scope for PCN.  One possible example would use 
      SIP pre-conditions.  However, there are others. 
 
   o  Global Coordination: PCN makes its admission decision based on 
      PCN-markings on a particular ingress-egress-aggregate.  Decisions 
      about flows through a different ingress-egress-aggregate are made 
      independently.  However, one can imagine network topologies and 
      traffic matrices where, from a global perspective, it would be 
      better to make a coordinated decision across all the ingress- 
      egress-aggregates for the whole PCN-domain.  For example, to block 
      (or even terminate) flows on one ingress-egress-aggregate so that 
      more important flows through a different ingress-egress-aggregate 
      could be admitted.  The problem may well be relatively 
      insignificant. 
 
   o  Aggregate Traffic Characteristics: Even when the number of flows 
      is stable, the traffic level through the PCN-domain will vary 
      because the sources vary their traffic rates.  PCN works best when 
      there is not too much variability in the total traffic level at a 
      PCN-node's interface (ie, in the aggregate traffic from all 
      sources).  Too much variation means that a node may (at one 
      moment) not be doing any PCN-marking and then (at another moment) 
      drop packets because it is overloaded.  This makes it hard to tune 
      the admission control scheme to stop admitting new flows at the 
      right time.  Therefore, the problem is more likely with fewer, 
      burstier flows. 
 
   o  Flash crowds and Speed of Reaction: PCN is a measurement-based 
      mechanism and so there is an inherent delay between packet marking 
      by PCN-interior-nodes and any admission control reaction at PCN- 
      boundary-nodes.  For example, if a big burst of admission requests 
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      potentially occurs in a very short space of time (eg, prompted by 
      a televote), they could all get admitted before enough PCN-marks 
      are seen to block new flows.  In other words, any additional load 
      offered within the reaction time of the mechanism must not move 
      the PCN-domain directly from a no congestion state to overload. 
      This "vulnerability period" may have an impact at the signalling 
      level, for instance, QoS requests should be rate-limited to bound 
      the number of requests able to arrive within the vulnerability 
      period. 
 
   o  Silent at Start: After a successful admission request, the source 
      may wait some time before sending data (eg, waiting for the called 
      party to answer).  Then the risk is that, in some circumstances, 
      PCN's measurements underestimate what the pre-congestion level 
      will be when the source does start sending data. 
 
7.  Security Considerations 
 
   Security considerations essentially come from the Trust Assumption 
   Section 6.3.1, ie, that all PCN-nodes are PCN-enabled and are trusted 
   for truthful PCN-metering and PCN-marking.  PCN splits functionality 
   between PCN-interior-nodes and PCN-boundary-nodes, and the security 
   considerations are somewhat different for each, mainly because PCN- 
   boundary-nodes are flow-aware and PCN-interior-nodes are not. 
 
   o  Because PCN-boundary-nodes are flow-aware, they are trusted to use 
      that awareness correctly.  The degree of trust required depends on 
      the kinds of decisions they have to make and the kinds of 
      information they need to make them.  There is nothing specific to 
      PCN. 
 
   o  The PCN-ingress-nodes police packets to ensure a PCN-flow sticks 
      within its agreed limit, and to ensure that only PCN-flows that 
      have been admitted contribute PCN-traffic into the PCN-domain. 
      The policer must drop (or perhaps downgrade to a different DSCP) 
      any PCN-packets received that are outside this remit.  This is 
      similar to the existing IntServ behaviour.  Between them, the PCN- 
      boundary-nodes must encircle the PCN-domain; otherwise, PCN- 
      packets could enter the PCN-domain without being subject to 
      admission control, which would potentially destroy the QoS of 
      existing flows. 
 
   o  PCN-interior-nodes are not flow-aware.  This prevents some 
      security attacks where an attacker targets specific flows in the 
      data plane -- for instance, for DoS or eavesdropping. 
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   o  The PCN-boundary-nodes rely on correct PCN-marking by the PCN- 
      interior-nodes.  For instance, a rogue PCN-interior-node could 
      PCN-mark all packets so that no flows were admitted.  Another 
      possibility is that it doesn't PCN-mark any packets, even when it 
      is pre-congested.  More subtly, the rogue PCN-interior-node could 
      perform these attacks selectively on particular flows, or it could 
      PCN-mark the correct fraction overall but carefully choose which 
      flows it marked. 
 
   o  The PCN-boundary-nodes should be able to deal with DoS attacks and 
      state exhaustion attacks based on fast changes in per-flow 
      signalling. 
 
   o  The signalling between the PCN-boundary-nodes must be protected 
      from attacks.  For example, the recipient needs to validate that 
      the message is indeed from the node that claims to have sent it. 
      Possible measures include digest authentication and protection 
      against replay and man-in-the-middle attacks.  For the RSVP 
      protocol specifically, hop-by-hop authentication is in [RFC2747], 
      and [Behringer09] may also be useful. 
 
   Operational security advice is given in Section 5.5. 
 
8.  Conclusions 
 
   This document describes a general architecture for flow admission and 
   termination based on pre-congestion information, in order to protect 
   the quality of service of established, inelastic flows within a 
   single Diffserv domain.  The main topic is the functional 
   architecture.  This document also mentions other topics like the 
   assumptions and open issues associated with the PCN architecture. 
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Appendix A.  Possible Future Work Items 
 
   This section mentions some topics that are outside the PCN WG's 
   current charter but that have been mentioned as areas of interest. 
   They might be work items for the PCN WG after a future re-chartering, 
   some other IETF WG, another standards body, or an operator-specific 
   usage that is not standardised. 
 
   Note: It should be crystal clear that this section discusses 
   possibilities only. 
 
   The first set of possibilities relate to the restrictions described 
   in Section 6.3: 
 
   o  A single PCN-domain encompasses several autonomous systems that do 
      not trust each other.  A possible solution is a mechanism like re- 
      PCN [Briscoe08]. 
 
   o  Not all the nodes run PCN.  For example, the PCN-domain is a 
      multi-site enterprise network.  The sites are connected by a VPN 
      tunnel; although PCN doesn't operate inside the tunnel, the PCN 
      mechanisms still work properly because of the good QoS on the 
      virtual link (the tunnel).  Another example is that PCN is 
      deployed on the general Internet (ie, widely but not universally 
      deployed). 
 
   o  Applying the PCN mechanisms to other types of traffic, ie, beyond 
      inelastic traffic -- for instance, applying the PCN mechanisms to 
      traffic scheduled with the Assured Forwarding per-hop behaviour. 
      One example could be flow-rate adaptation by elastic applications 
      that adapt according to the pre-congestion information. 
 
   o  The aggregation assumption doesn't hold, because the link capacity 
      is too low.  Measurement-based admission control is less accurate, 
      with a greater risk of over-admission for instance. 
 
   o  The applicability of PCN mechanisms for emergency use (911, GETS, 
      WPS, MLPP, etc.). 
 
   Other possibilities include: 
 
   o  Probing.  This is discussed in Appendix A.1 below. 
 
   o  The PCN-domain extends to the end users.  This scenario is 
      described in [Babiarz06].  The end users need to be trusted to do 
      their own policing.  If there is sufficient traffic, then the 
      aggregation assumption may hold.  A variant is that the PCN-domain 
      extends out as far as the LAN edge switch. 
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   o  Indicating pre-congestion through signalling messages rather than 
      in-band (in the form of PCN-marked packets). 
 
   o  The decision-making functionality is at a centralised node rather 
      than at the PCN-boundary-nodes.  This requires that the PCN- 
      egress-node signals PCN-feedback-information to the centralised 
      node, and that the centralised node signals to the PCN-ingress- 
      node the decision about admission (or termination).  Such 
      possibility may need the centralised node and the PCN-boundary- 
      nodes to be configured with each other's addresses.  The 
      centralised case is described further in [Tsou08]. 
 
   o  Signalling extensions for specific protocols (eg, RSVP and NSIS) 
      -- for example, the details of how the signalling protocol 
      installs the flowspec at the PCN-ingress-node for an admitted PCN- 
      flow, and how the signalling protocol carries the PCN-feedback- 
      information.  Perhaps also for other functions such as for coping 
      with failure of a PCN-boundary-node ([Briscoe06] considers what 
      happens if RSVP is the QoS signalling protocol) and for 
      establishing a tunnel across the PCN-domain if it is necessary to 
      carry ECN marks transparently. 
 
   o  Policing by the PCN-ingress-node may not be needed if the PCN- 
      domain can trust that the upstream network has already policed the 
      traffic on its behalf. 
 
   o  PCN for Pseudowire.  PCN may be used as a congestion avoidance 
      mechanism for edge-to-edge pseudowire emulations [Bryant08]. 
 
   o  PCN for MPLS.  [RFC3270] defines how to support the Diffserv 
      architecture in MPLS (Multiprotocol Label Switching) networks. 
      [RFC5129] describes how to add PCN for admission control of 
      microflows into a set of MPLS aggregates.  PCN-marking is done in 
      MPLS's EXP field (which [RFC5462] re-names the Class of Service 
      (CoS) field). 
 
   o  PCN for Ethernet.  Similarly, it may be possible to extend PCN 
      into Ethernet networks, where PCN-marking is done in the Ethernet 
      header.  Note: Specific consideration of this extension is outside 
      of the IETF's remit. 
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A.1.  Probing 
 
A.1.1.  Introduction 
 
   Probing is a potential mechanism to assist admission control. 
 
   PCN's admission control, as described so far, is essentially a 
   reactive mechanism where the PCN-egress-node monitors the pre- 
   congestion level for traffic from each PCN-ingress-node; if the level 
   rises, then it blocks new flows on that ingress-egress-aggregate. 
   However, it's possible that an ingress-egress-aggregate carries no 
   traffic, and so the PCN-egress-node can't make an admission decision 
   using the usual method described earlier. 
 
   One approach is to be "optimistic" and simply admit the new flow. 
   However, it's possible to envisage a scenario where the traffic 
   levels on other ingress-egress-aggregates are already so high that 
   they're blocking new PCN-flows, and admitting a new flow onto this 
   "empty" ingress-egress-aggregate adds extra traffic onto a link that 
   is already pre-congested.  This may 'tip the balance' so that PCN's 
   flow termination mechanism is activated or some packets are dropped. 
   This risk could be lessened by configuring, on each link, a 
   sufficient 'safety margin' above the PCN-threshold-rate. 
 
   An alternative approach is to make PCN a more proactive mechanism. 
   The PCN-ingress-node explicitly determines, before admitting the 
   prospective new flow, whether the ingress-egress-aggregate can 
   support it.  This can be seen as a "pessimistic" approach, in 
   contrast to the "optimism" of the approach above.  It involves 
   probing: a PCN-ingress-node generates and sends probe packets in 
   order to test the pre-congestion level that the flow would 
   experience. 
 
   One possibility is that a probe packet is just a dummy data packet, 
   generated by the PCN-ingress-node and addressed to the PCN-egress- 
   node. 
 
A.1.2.  Probing Functions 
 
   The probing functions are: 
 
   o  Make the decision that probing is needed.  As described above, 
      this is when the ingress-egress-aggregate (or the ECMP path -- see 
      Section 6.4) carries no PCN-traffic.  An alternative is to always 
      probe, ie, probe before admitting any PCN-flow. 
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   o  (if required) Communicate the request that probing is needed; the 
      PCN-egress-node signals to the PCN-ingress-node that probing is 
      needed. 
 
   o  (if required) Generate probe traffic; the PCN-ingress-node 
      generates the probe traffic.  The appropriate number (or rate) of 
      probe packets will depend on the PCN-metering algorithm; for 
      example, an excess-traffic-metering algorithm triggers fewer PCN- 
      marks than a threshold-metering algorithm, and so will need more 
      probe packets. 
 
   o  Forward probe packets; as far as PCN-interior-nodes are concerned, 
      probe packets are handled the same as (ordinary data) PCN-packets 
      in terms of routing, scheduling, and PCN-marking. 
 
   o  Consume probe packets; the PCN-egress-node consumes probe packets 
      to ensure that they don't travel beyond the PCN-domain. 
 
A.1.3.  Discussion of Rationale for Probing, Its Downsides and Open 
        Issues 
 
   It is an unresolved question whether probing is really needed, but 
   two viewpoints have been put forward as to why it is useful.  The 
   first is perhaps the most obvious: there is no PCN-traffic on the 
   ingress-egress-aggregate.  The second assumes that multipath routing 
   (eg, ECMP) is running in the PCN-domain.  We now consider each in 
   turn. 
 
   The first viewpoint assumes the following: 
 
   o  There is no PCN-traffic on the ingress-egress-aggregate (so a 
      normal admission decision cannot be made). 
 
   o  Simply admitting the new flow has a significant risk of leading to 
      overload: packets dropped or flows terminated. 
 
   On the former bullet, [Eardley07] suggests that, during the future 
   busy hour of a national network with about 100 PCN-boundary-nodes, 
   there are likely to be significant numbers of aggregates with very 
   few flows under nearly all circumstances. 
 
   The latter bullet could occur if new flows start on many of the empty 
   ingress-egress-aggregates, which together overload a link in the PCN- 
   domain.  To be a problem, this would probably have to happen in a 
   short time period (flash crowd) because, after the reaction time of 
   the system, other (non-empty) ingress-egress-aggregates that pass 
   through the link will measure pre-congestion and so block new flows. 
   Also, flows naturally end anyway. 
 
 
 
Eardley                      Informational                     [Page 51] 
 
RFC 5559                    PCN Architecture                   June 2009 
 
 
   The downsides of probing for this viewpoint are: 
 
   o  Probing adds delay to the admission control process. 
 
   o  Sufficient probing traffic has to be generated to test the pre- 
      congestion level of the ingress-egress-aggregate.  But the probing 
      traffic itself may cause pre-congestion, causing other PCN-flows 
      to be blocked or even terminated -- and, in the flash crowd 
      scenario, there will be probing on many ingress-egress-aggregates. 
 
   The second viewpoint applies in the case where there is multipath 
   routing (eg, ECMP) in the PCN-domain.  Note that ECMP is often used 
   on core networks.  There are two possibilities: 
 
   (1)  If admission control is based on measurements of the ingress- 
        egress-aggregate, then the viewpoint that probing is useful 
        assumes: 
 
        *  There's a significant chance that the traffic is unevenly 
           balanced across the ECMP paths and, hence, there's a 
           significant risk of admitting a flow that should be blocked 
           (because it follows an ECMP path that is pre-congested) or of 
           blocking a flow that should be admitted. 
 
        Note: [Charny07-3] suggests unbalanced traffic is quite 
        possible, even with quite a large number of flows on a PCN-link 
        (eg, 1000), when Assumption 3 (aggregation) is likely to be 
        satisfied. 
 
   (2)  If admission control is based on measurements of pre-congestion 
        on specific ECMP paths, then the viewpoint that probing is 
        useful assumes: 
 
        *  There is no PCN-traffic on the ECMP path on which to base an 
           admission decision. 
 
        *  Simply admitting the new flow has a significant risk of 
           leading to overload. 
 
        *  The PCN-egress-node can match a packet to an ECMP path. 
 
        Note: This is similar to the first viewpoint and so, similarly, 
        could occur in a flash crowd if a new flow starts more or less 
        simultaneously on many of the empty ECMP paths.  Because there 
        are several ECMP paths between each pair of PCN-boundary-nodes, 
        it's presumably more likely that an ECMP path is "empty" than an 
        ingress-egress-aggregate is.  To constrain the number of ECMP 
        paths, a few tunnels could be set up between each pair of PCN- 
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        boundary-nodes.  Tunnelling also solves the issue in the point 
        immediately above (which is otherwise hard to solve because an 
        ECMP routing decision is made independently on each node). 
 
   The downsides of probing for this viewpoint are: 
 
   o  Probing adds delay to the admission control process. 
 
   o  Sufficient probing traffic has to be generated to test the pre- 
      congestion level of the ECMP path.  But there's the risk that the 
      probing traffic itself may cause pre-congestion, causing other 
      PCN-flows to be blocked or even terminated. 
 
   o  The PCN-egress-node needs to consume the probe packets to ensure 
      they don't travel beyond the PCN-domain, since they might confuse 
      the destination end node.  This is non-trivial, since probe 
      packets are addressed to the destination end node in order to test 
      the relevant ECMP path (ie, they are not addressed to the PCN- 
      egress-node, unlike the first viewpoint above). 
 
   The open issues associated with these viewpoints include: 
 
   o  What rate and pattern of probe packets does the PCN-ingress-node 
      need to generate so that there's enough traffic to make the 
      admission decision? 
 
   o  What difficulty does the delay (whilst probing is done), and 
      possible packet drops, cause applications? 
 
   o  Can the delay be alleviated by automatically and periodically 
      probing on the ingress-egress-aggregate?  Or does this add too 
      much overhead? 
 
   o  Are there other ways of dealing with the flash crowd scenario? 
      For instance, by limiting the rate at which new flows are 
      admitted, or perhaps by a PCN-egress-node blocking new flows on 
      its empty ingress-egress-aggregates when its non-empty ones are 
      pre-congested. 
 
   o  (Second viewpoint only) How does the PCN-egress-node disambiguate 
      probe packets from data packets (so it can consume the former)? 
      The PCN-egress-node must match the characteristic setting of 
      particular bits in the probe packet's header or body, but these 
      bits must not be used by any PCN-interior-node's ECMP algorithm. 
      In the general case, this isn't possible, but it should be 
      possible for a typical ECMP algorithm (which examines the source 
      and destination IP addresses and port numbers, the protocol ID, 
      and the DSCP). 
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